ON POSSIBILITY AND necessity...
There is a commonsense notion of what it means for an action or event to be possible. We tend to think of it as something that can conceivably occur. We'd like to think, that even though I wore blue socks when I was dressing up this morning, it is possible that I could have worn green socks.
This commonsense notion of possibility is in direct opposition to the notion of determinism. In the natural sciences we have a deterministic notion of the universe. Roughly speaking: the things that happen are governed by a set of physical laws and can be predicted given sufficient information.
Even within the natural universe we often want to make statements about possible events. While we might not be inclined to say that it is possible for a ball to be suspended in the air without any force acting on it, we might want to claim that it is possible that tomorrow will be a windy day.
Some people might be inclined to dismiss possibility as a consequence of a certain epistemic lack. If we knew all the facts about every object and system in the universe we would know with certainty what will happen and what will not. We would know some facts about how my brain works and why it will lead me to wear blue socks instead of green socks. There would be nothing that is possible outside of what will happen. In this strictly deterministic sense, when we make statements about what could happen or what is possible, it is a purely linguistic convention which conveys our epistemic lack.
But suppose you and I are of a more liberal mindset. Suppose we believe that systems that display varying levels of randomness can exist, and that even if we knew all of the facts about the natural universe it is (in the common sense notion) possible that I could have worn blue or green socks this morning.
What we find is that setting up a rigorous definition of possibility is almost, if not exactly, impossible without circling back on the common sense notion of possibility and chance. We usually use some idea of actions being consistent or compatible within systems, or of being able to imagine, or being able to conceive of events occurring.
Section 2 deals with various theories philosophers have used to try and pin the tail on possibility. In Section 2.1 we look at actualism; the idea that our world is the only actual world and all other possible worlds are merely abstract ideas. In Section 2.2 we consider concreteism; the idea that all possible worlds are actual worlds and our world is only 'actual' relative to us. In Section 2.3 we briefly consider a few ways of defining possibility without invoking the notion of other 'worlds'.
In Section 3 we look at various attempts to consolidate modal theories with mathematical models of probability. Section 3.4 looks at Celeste Newman's theory of fixed possibilities. We'll ask the following questions: Does the obliteration of a 'possible world' correlate to a decrease in possibilities? At the extreme end, does the obliteration of all possible worlds reduce into determinism? Finally, we'll ask the question: Does it make sense to speak about 'the end of the world', or even 'the end of all worlds'?
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Secrets of Kolini
Fantasy"Let me be clear. I never willingly discuss this. And the few people to whom I have had to are as twisted and wretched as I was back then; As blinded by their own light. They cannot see the light from outside. I want no part in this, but it is far...
