Admiral Kimmel, who took command of the overall defense in Hawaii, conveyed to Admiral William Halsey, in charge of the aircraft carrier fleet, and Admiral William Pye, in charge of the battleship fleet, that in the worst case, the number of our aircraft carriers could double, and there was a possibility that the Japanese aircraft on their side could reach nearly 600.
"Even if we might face up to twelve aircraft carriers at most, our firepower per carrier is overwhelmingly superior. No matter how many carriers they have, the crucial factors are the number and performance of the aircraft on board, as well as the skill of the crew. After all, carriers are just a means of transporting planes to the battlefield. Moreover, the number of aircraft per carrier on our side is considerably higher, and the performance of our planes and crew is clearly superior. The difference in the number of carriers is not a significant factor, so you can rest assured."
To the concerned Kimmel, Halsey responded in this manner with a confident smile on his face.
Despite his seemingly careless demeanor, Halsey, in reality, valued information more than anyone else, prioritizing facts and evidence above all else. Therefore, he never engaged in neglectful actions regarding the study of the enemy and countermeasures.
"Admiral Kimmel mentioned that the Japanese aircraft could reach nearly 600. What are your thoughts?"
Responding to Halsey's direct inquiry about the information he wanted to know, the aviation staff provided only essential points in his answer.
"According to the Pacific Fleet's intelligence, the aircraft that attacked our friendly bases at Iba and Clark Field in the Philippines at the beginning of the war numbered nearly 100 each. In other words, to operate over 200 aircraft with a minimum of four carriers, the capability is required. The only Japanese carriers capable of that are the Amagi-class. The converted Kongō-class carriers are clearly smaller in size compared to our Lexington-class, and their size is closer to the British Eagle or the French Béarn, so the number of aircraft carried is not expected to be significantly higher. Of course, by doubling the hangars on the Kongō-class carriers, they could increase the number of aircraft carried to some extent, but I don't think they would go to such thorough modifications on these old battleships with limited remaining service life. If that's the case, the carriers deployed on the Pacific front would be four Amagi-class carriers and Kongō-class carriers each. Additionally, regarding the armored carriers the Japanese Navy was reportedly constructing under the Circle 3 Plan, with no clear information, it would be safer to assume they are already operational. It's more dangerous to underestimate the enemy's strength than to overestimate it. As for the crucial aircraft, the intelligence department estimates around 50 aircraft for the Amagi class carriers, 30 to 40 for the Kongō-class carriers, and possibly a bit more for the armored carriers. I don't have any objections to this assessment. However, when it comes to the armored carriers, they might carry a few more aircraft depending on the extent and thickness of the armor. Considering the concerns raised by the aviation staff, assuming 60 aircraft for the armored carriers would be reasonable."
Halsey made the calculations in his head. Assuming 55 aircraft for each Amagi-class carrier, 40 for each Kongō-class carrier, and an additional 60 for the armored carriers, the total would be 620. Their regular aircraft number 456, so in simple terms, the enemy has an advantage of over 30%. However, this is only in the worst-case scenario. If the number of aircraft per carrier is less than our estimate, or if the armored carriers don't participate, the gap will narrow significantly, and in some cases, a reversal may even be possible.
"As long as we assume the enemy has twelve carriers and 620 aircraft, there shouldn't be a problem. By the way, how are the four carriers that attacked the Philippines doing? When they join the twelve carriers, our disadvantage will be hard to avoid."
Having shifted his gaze from the aviation staff to the intelligence staff, Halsey continued his questioning.
"The four carriers that attacked the Philippines have been confirmed to be wreaking havoc in the southern theater. Even assuming these carriers immediately head towards Wake Island, it is impossible for them to join forces with the main fleets of both our fleet and the Japanese fleet before they clash."
Regarding the greatest concern, the four carriers in the southern theater, it is confirmed that they will not join the Japanese fleet heading to Wake Island. To double-check, Halsey also posed the same question to the navigation staff. His response was consistent with that of the intelligence staff.
"It seems the Japanese military has violated the cardinal rule of warfare by dispersing their forces. Perhaps they assumed we had at most six carriers. In that case, we need to educate them. The ultimate principle of warfare is to defeat the enemy's forces with our full strength," Halsey cackled.
The showdown between the main fleets of the United States and Japan at Wake Island was drawing near.
Task Force 1
- Battleships West Virginia, Maryland, Colorado, Tennessee, California
- 4 light cruisers, 16 destroyers
Task Force 16
- Enterprise (27 × F4Fs, 36 × SBDs, 15 × TBDs)
- Saratoga (27 × F4Fs, 36 × SBDs, 15 × TBDs)
- 3 heavy cruisers, 8 destroyers
Task Force 17
- Yorktown (27 × F4Fs, 36 × SBDs, 15 × TBDs)
- Lexington (27 × F4Fs, 36 × SBDs, 15 × TBDs)
- 3 heavy cruisers, 8 destroyers
Task Force 19
- Wasp (27 × F4Fs, 36 × SBDs, 9 × TBDs)
- Ranger (27 × F4Fs, 36 × SBDs, 9 × TBDs)
- 3 heavy cruisers, 8 destroyers
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Aviation-Centric Combined Fleet
Historical Fiction「It is no longer the era of battleships. From now on, airplanes are the mainstay of the Navy.」 Which one is it? The doctrine of big ships and big guns or perhaps air power? The power struggle within the Navy, however, takes an unexpected turn. Due t...
